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Abstact
The paper discusses the recent literature on abstraction/idealization in connection with
the “paradox of infinite idealization.” We use the case of taking thermodynamics limit
in dealing with the phenomena of phase transition and critical phenomena to broach
the subject. We then argue that the method of infinite idealization is widely used
in the practice of science, and not all uses of the method are the same (or evoke the
same philosophical problems). We then confront the compatibility problem of infinite
idealization with scientific realism. We propose and defend a contextualist position
for (local) realism and argue that the cases for infinite idealization appear to be fully
compatible with contextual realism.
1 Introduction
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When philosophers of science talk about science today, they are most likely talking
about a social activity that comprises a highly disciplined and distinct practice that
produces what we regard as the best example of knowledge. This body of knowledge
has many disciplines and each discipline at least an experimental component and a
theoretical component. The theoretical component contains, inter alia, claims that
are true (which means what they say correspond to what exists or happens in reality).
Philosophers are divided on which sort of claims can obtain truth of this correspondence
sort. Scientific realists believe and think they have good reason to believe that highly
abstract and theoretical claims are about existing entities and can be true (or false)
of their behavior. Anti-realists are skeptical about such a belief and only willing to
concede truth to claims about the observable. Among the arguments for scientific
realism, the inference-to-the-best-explanation argument (or its variations) stands out.
According to Boyd’s version of the argument(Boyd, 1983), the instrumental reliability
of scientific practice would be a miracle if the theories such practice essentially depends
on were not true or approximately true.
1First, let me thank Samuel Fletcher and Patricia Palacios, without whom this paper would not
have been written. I also thank three anonymous referees for their constructive criticisms.
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The qualifying phrase “approximately true” is added to accommodate the ubiq-
uitous situation where a scientific theory rarely contains true claims simpliciter. They
rather contain true enough claims which later developments can and do improve upon.
Instrumental successes in the history of human civilization rarely require truth. Ap-
proximate truth that matches the levels or degrees of practical or instrumental discrim-
ination suffices to explain the practical or instrumental successes and therefore provides
reason for realism that tolerates approximate truth.
Looking independently at scientific theories, it is difficult to miss one of their cru-
cial features, a feature almost all highly developed and especially highly mathematical
theories have in common. And the feature is idealization. Idealization is an act in
coming up with a scientific representation (e.g. a model) or a theory that distorts
a chosen aspect or property of a system (the target system) such that the represen-
tation or theory becomes manageable. For example, the idealized frictionless plane
(assuming no such planes exist in reality) is a distortion of a real plane such that a
model of a frictionless block moving uniformly and perpetually on it becomes possible.
Idealizaiton may also be used by philosophers of science to refer to the products of the
acts of idealization (in our sense). The frictionless plane, the object, may be called the
idealization rather than the act of completely smoothing out an actual plane in imag-
ination so as to arrive at a mental picture of frictionless plane. We do not regard this
as an important issue to settle. The word “idealization” may well be left harmlessly
ambiguous as many words in a language are naturally ambiguous. Idealization may
also be used to refer to both the act and its products.2
Abstraction is also a widely used method in theory construction. Abstraction
differs from idealization in that by abstraction one selects some aspects or properties
of a system for studying (while neglecting others), while by idealization, such selected
aspects or properties often need to be idealized for use. Let us consider a block moving
on a plane. While abstraction allows us to select only the mechanical aspects of the
block and the plane on which it moves, making the block and the plane frictionless is a
further act, and it is a mental act of distortion on the chosen, i.e. mechanical, property.
While a model as a result of abstraction alone is a simplified system (as opposed to the
target system), it does not necessarily contain distortion or alteration of any properties.
Therefore, claims produced from the abstract model can be literally true, as long as the
claims are about the chosen properties and/or their relations alone. Idealization does
imply a distortion and therefore renders claims about the modeled properties literally
2This point is for responding to a criticism we received that finds our using “idealization” to refer
to the act or practice rather than the product as needing an argument to defend.
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false 3 As with idealization, the word “abstraction” as a term of art may also be left
ambiguous, referring either to the act of abstracting or the product of abstraction.
Another marked difference between abstraction and idealization is that the former
is usually a categorical method, meaning picking out (an abstracted) category or type
of objects by selecting a group of properties, while the later is usually quantitative
and very often infinitely or infinitesimally quantitative, meaning the distortion of a
property is by continuous degrees and the end of the distortion is very often a point
of limit. Smoothing out a rough and actual plane in imagination is by degrees and
continuously so, and the frictionless plane can be regarded as either infinitesimally
close to frictionless or the point of limit as the smoothing act is carried out indefinitely.
Therefore, the close connection between idealization and infinite idealization is not just
a simple relation between a genus and a species, but more as that the latter is a further
articulation of the former. If one insists, one can plausibly argue that all idealizations
are infinite idealizations in some form or shape. However, we do not endorse this last
move and do not think it is either necessary or beneficial philosophically to hold such
an extreme view.
Therefore, there is a natural and close connection between a general discussion of
idealization as an essential tool of scientific practice and discussing the issue concerning
infinite idealization. Closely connected with the discussion of infinite idealization is the
recent literature on the “paradox of phase transitions,” in which the necessity and
nature of taking the thermodynamic limit is debated. We conduct In Section 4 a
survey of the various contributions to the debate and comment on the various moves.
The apparent paradox is created when one has, on the one hand, a thermodynamic
account of phase transitions (as such common phenomena as water boiling and ice
melting) involves indispensable non-analytic points while, on the other hand, a statis-
tical mechanical account of the same phenomena can only recover such points if the
model systems are of infinite sizes (with finite density). The latter is an idealization of
molecular thermo-systems that appears to cross over to the impossible. We shall use
this as a case-study for the facets of infinite idealization. We then discuss other sorts
of infinite idealization and clarify their essential differences.
Section 5 brings out the challenges of these cases to scientific realism. We sur-
vey a couple of most prevalent formulations of scientific realism and explain how four
challenges that realism so construed are most likely to face. A detailed analysis of
why infinity poses a special problem with accommodating realism is then given. For
3Here we assume a correspondence theory of truth since we are mostly dealing with issues relating
to scientific realism.
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instance, we give a detailed study of how an otherwise plausible account of confirma-
tion of idealized theories (namely Laymon’s theory) that is arguably compatible with
scientific realism encounters problems with infinite idealization.
In section 6, we propose and defend a contextualist position on realism claims. We
endorse Dummett’s local version of realism that deals with questions of existence or
truth of objects or claims of disputed classes. Then with regard to claims under infinite
idealization, we investigate the truth conditions for realist claims, such as the existence
of phase transitions as taking place in infinite systems and the truth about claims
concerning such systems. We then argue that the truth conditions of such (realist)
claims depend on the contexts in which such claims are evaluated; and the the contexts
are determined by the fundamental or grounding or “anchoring” abstractions and/or
idealizations. Scientists may be inclined towards realism, but they are not necessarily
realists in the same universal or global context regardless of their areas and disciplines
(case in point, many physicists working with quantum theory may be perfect realists
except when regarding quantum theory, per se). We first discuss the cases of infinite
idealization to introduce and illustrate the aspects of contextual realism, and then we
articulate and defend it more generally.
Before we get to the main arguments of this paper, we define and defend, in sections
2 and 3, two closely associated distinctions as preliminaries: the distinction between
the KT approach and the SM approach; and the distinction between idealization (as-
sociated with the KT approach) and abstraction (associated with the SM approach).
2 Two Different Approaches to Thermo-Phenomena
In order to fully appreciate the paradox of phase transition, a closer look at the re-
lationship between thermodynamics (TD) and statistical mechanics (SM) is in order.
Mainwood (2005) is perceptive when he made in his article a distinction between a
“reduction problem” and an “idealization problem.” The reduction problem with re-
spect to such phenomena as phase transition and critical phenomena is a problem of
how a TD account is related to a SM account such that one or another conception of
inter-theoretical reduction is exemplified. What we want to point out at the outset of
our discussion, however, is that the reduction of TD to SM (or the recovery of TD from
SM) cannot be simply understood as a reduction of a phenomenological account (as the
TD account) to a mechanical account in terms of a detailed account of the molecular
motion of the same system. An example of such a reduction would be Boyle’s account
of temperature, pressure, and the like of an ideal gas. The motion of molecules are
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highly idealized, and yet the derivations are fully mechanical in that temperature and
pressure, for instance, are no more than algebraic aggregates of idealized mechanical
accounts of individual molecular motion. Boltzmann’s kinetic theory of gases may be
regarded as another example of the same sort of reduction. The SM reduction of TD
is not such a reduction. SM is not a mechanical theory of molecular motion because
it does not tell us anything about the details of the molecular motion inside a gas or
liquid. It is a much more abstract account than a mechanical one.
In the study of thermo-systems (systems that comprise large number of much
smaller components), one must make a choice of two different approaches, which may
not even be compatible. The two approaches we discuss here are conceptual rather
than historically actual (although they do have distinct historical origins), and we refer
to them as the KT (kinetic-theoretic) approach and the SM (statistical-mechanical)
approach. One approach is to make drastic and entirely unrealistic assumptions about
the molecular motion, and the other is to make little or no assumptions about them in
particular. If we may regard Boyle’s ideal gas model as an exemplar of the former ap-
proach, which is a highly idealized model in dealing with a thermo-system, i.e., diluted
gas, we must call Gibbs’s SM treatment/approach of the same system “non-idealized.”
The point of SM is to make as little idealized (therefore obviously false) assumptions
about the thermo-system as possible, and still rigorously recover the TD account of the
system’s thermo-behavior. This is why when modifying the end products (theories or
models) of these two approaches, radically different conceptions have to be employed.4
Boyle’s model can be replaced by van der Waals’s model by removing some of the
idealizations, such as zero-size of all molecules and no interactions among molecules.
When an estimate (also idealized) of size and interaction as simple coefficients or con-
stants is added to the van der Waals equation, an improvement of the model/theory
is made.5 On the other hand, no improvement of this sort can be introduced to made
a SM account better. The only window through which any microscopic details of the
studied system can be glimpsed is the form of the Hamiltonian for the system. Giving
up obviously false idealizations about the components means to make the Hamiltonian
4There are numerous excellent standard texts of statistical mechanics in physics, but the work we
rely on in this paper, a work in which an account of how the use of probability allows people such as
Boltzmann and Gibbs to come up with an abstract study of thermo-systems, is Guttmann (1999). Our
discussion of SM depends heavily on this work.
5I thank a referee for pointing out that in (Morrison, 2005) this traditional or textbook interpretation
of the relationship between Boyle’s model and van der Waals’s model is challenged. Since the traditional
interpretation is adopted here so that the case serves to make a distinction, I do not feel it is necessary to
discuss the controversy. Granted, a better case whose interpretation is not subject to any controversies
would have better served the purpose.
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function as general and lack of particulars as possible. Once the Hamiltonian is de-
termined, the partition function is determined, and all thermo-behavior is determined
by the algebraic relations of the various partial derivatives of the partition function.
Figuratively speaking, all the information about a thermo-system is packed into the
partition function, which carries within it the Hamiltonian of the system. One may
choose another coupling constant to represent the nature of interaction between two
randomly chosen elements of the system, so as to chose a different Hamiltonian. Other
than that, the SM account of system is entirely fixed. No considerations of the size,
the variation, the overall structural features, etc. of the system and its components can
enter into any attempt to modify or improve upon the SM account/model. Obviously
what is said so briefly here is not accurate. A more accurate account comes later when
we discuss the details of the SM account of phase transitions.
Some caveats have to be observed before we can understand and properly defend
the above.6 First of all, if the KT approach is not much more than what is historically
found in the kinetic theory of gases, it could not serve as a counterpart of the SM
approach, which is essential the actual approach currently used in statistical mechan-
ics. For example, it would be of no use in discussing several important cases (which
we will later come to) of phase transitions and critical phenomena, such as the tran-
sition from para- to ferro-magnetism. The concept of the KT approach, in contrast
to the SM approach, is not supposed to be an actual historical approach. It is rather
a historically based conceptual category that emphasizes the kinetic nature of molec-
ular movements (including small vibrations around a fixed point). We can imagine a
rigorously implemented microscopically detailed mechanical account of the molecular
arrangements and movements of all molecules in a body, where the body could be a
gas or a liquid, or a solid. By properly idealizing the appropriate properties of these
molecules, we build a reasonably workable model of the body. A recovery of the body’s
TD properties and the relations among the properties, such as entropy, pressure, and
heat capacity, can be carried out with minor help from the theory of probability. It is
this approach that is diagonally opposed to the SM approach. Second, it is certainly not
true that the SM approach, though heavy in abstraction, does not contain any idealiza-
tion. We will not list here all the hidden idealizations that go with the SM treatment of
a thermo-system, but obviously the assumption that all molecules/elements in a system
are alike and interact randomly and the interaction can be characterized by a single
(or a few) Hamiltonian(s) is an idealization. The actual system is presumably more
heterogeneous. These idealizations, as we argue extensively later, in connection with
6We thank a referee for raising the point that is dealt with in this paragraph.
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our defense of contextual realism, are special idealizations. We call them anchoring
or grounding idealizations. They are idealizations that isolate a discipline in science
within which claims about what entities exist and what entities do not are determined.
They are different from regular idealizations that scientists use within a discipline or
area of inquiry.
It is not entirely unreasonable to separate these two ways of reduction with respect
to the thermodynamic and the mechanical relationship. I shall call the former the
idealization approach and the latter the abstraction approach. Given what we have
said about the distinction between the two, here are some further reasons why this is
a good idea.
3 The Distinction between Abstraction and Idealization
In an excellent general analysis of the two notions: idealization and abstraction, Godfrey-
Smith (2009) (see also, Jones (2005),Woods and Rosales (2010)7, Knox (2016)) begins
with an analysis of the phenomena in the practice of science rather than how the two
terms are discussed in the philosophical literature. Godfrey-Smith comes up with the
following distinguishing features of the two types of activities. Idealization is usually
associated with “treating things as having features they clearly do not have[,]” while
abstraction is an act “leaving things out, while still giving a literally true description
(p.1, my italics).” Further, abstraction is said to result in a simplified but still literally
true or faithful representation of the target system, while idealization is a product of
imagination that usually results in a fictional system that are literally false but often
approximately true of the target system.
Godfrey-Smith’s insight that “abstraction” should be reserved for denoting a prac-
tice that results in simplified yet true/faithful representation, while idealization neces-
sarily brings in distortion rings true. However, it still does not solve the problem of
when to call a model an idealized one and when to call it an abstraction. Trying to
tell which is fictional and which is not does not seem to help. Here is our amendment
of Godfrey-Smith’s account. First, one should notice that idealization and abstraction
are usually associated with different products. Models are idealized but equations and
statements, especially mathematical statements, are abstract. This is of course not
always true, for models can be abstract as well. But the difference is that a model
7(Jones, 2005) is a discussion of the distinction that predates Godfrey-Smith (2009) but is of a more
limited scope, dealing mostly with the distinction between idealization and abstraction in modeling
practice. (Woods and Rosales, 2010) is a wonderful study of different sorts of distortion in model-
building including abstraction without emphasizing the distinction.
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is often an object that must have sufficient details while statements can be made on
one or another aspect or part of the model system. Idealized models are often used
for scientists to make abstract claims about how the modeled system behave. And if
only abstraction is essential to such claims while idealization not essential, the claims
can be literally true even if the model is highly idealized. A claim about the pressure
of a diluted gas can be entirely true, not approximately true, when it is derived from
Boyle’s ideal gas model. The model is highly idealized but since the equation for the
gas pressure is abstract enough to be insensitive to the idealization, the claims can be
literally true and agreeing with the experimental result within the margin of error.
This way of looking at the distinction, namely, idealization builds models while
abstraction concerns the claims that can be generated from the models that are never-
theless literally true, makes further sense when we realize that models are not always
concrete systems that are the results of imagination. A set of equations can be regarded
as a model. In that case, idealization may not even enter in the “equations.” The equa-
tions are claims that are true, although they are highly abstract. When scientists pick
properties from a complex target systems and try to find true claims to say about them,
while not worrying about what the target system is like, abstraction is the act. It is not
idealization that is at work there. But when a concrete and complete system is “build”
from the target system, a model in “flesh-n-blood,” distortion is usually necessary, and
the result is usually a simplified but concrete system, often a geometric or structural
system.
Based on the above amendment of Godfrey-Smith’s account of the distinction, which
is an account of the acts in the practice of science, not one for the semantics of the
terms, we may say the crucial difference is this.
• Idealization is an act that distorts chosen features in order to make them simpler
in a model representation.
• Abstraction is an act that formulates claims about chosen features as they are,
as if in isolation.
Abstraction is therefore more common and less problematic. More common be-
cause ordinary language use is full of abstract claims, and less problematic because
abstract claims are either true or false, much like claims that do not involve abstrac-
tion. Idealization is less common-place but also exists outside of scientific practice. It
often involves fictional imagination and the results are not regarded as capable of being
literally true. Idealization usually result in concrete models that differ from what they
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are used to represent, abstraction is more often used to directly make claims about a
target system only in selected aspects. Again, abstract claims can be made without the
mediation of modeling, while idealization is primarily a method of model construction.8
Idealization is made possible in model construction by the fact that idealized models
are often resembling in some sense the target system. Abstraction is made possible by
the modularity of nature. A ball may be red AND big or yellow AND big. If that is
impossible in general, (namely, all properties are holistically correlated such that there
can only be red and big balls or yellow and small balls; and that’s true for all n-tuples
of properties,) then abstraction is impossible as well.
We now return to our discussion of phase transition and infinite idealization with
greater depth, now that we are clear about the distinction between idealization and
abstraction. The difference we introduced at the beginning, the difference between
the two different “reducers” of thermodynamics, should now appear in a better light.
The KT account of gases and the like depends heavily on models as the result of
idealization of one sort or another. This is what we called the idealization approach.
The SM account is more “abstract” than that, and hence the abstraction approach.
The account is mostly systems of equations centered around the partition function
of a certain ensembles (micro or canonical or grand ensembles) that has a specific
Hamiltonian. The SM account only chooses those magnitudes that can be treated
statistically and come up with averages that cross over to TD magnitudes. Therefore,
it is more applicable to use the notion of abstraction rather than idealization. And as
a result, no concrete or semi-concrete imaginary systems of molecules are necessary for
coming up with SM results that are true to the TD counterparts.
The above discussion yields results that differ from John Norton’s analysis of similar
cases, although there are many points of agreements (Norton, 2014, 2012; Batterman,
2005). In his attempt to clear the confusion in the Reductionism debate concerning
condensed matter physics, Norton (2012) proposed a distinction between two different
senses of reductional levels. One sense is what he calls the “Molecular-Thermodynamic”
reductional levels. This is the standard level separation between TD and SM. The
other is what he calls the “Few Components-Many Components” reductional levels.
Both levels are in the molecular level, and both are treated mechanically. The many-
component system is said to be reducible to the few or single component system.
The example Norton uses to illustrate this second sense of reductional levels is the
8A very similar point is made by Norton (2014, 2012), as we shall see in our discussion of his works
below.
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ideal gas law. Obviously, the kinetic treatments of thermo-systems of Maxwell and
Boltzmann that we have discussed before also belong to this sense. Norton (2014)
(see also Norton (2012)) has argued for a different conception of the pair: idealization
and approximation. In the context of models and modeling, we can safely characterize
Norton’s two notions as follows. Idealization is a method that allows scientist to imagine
fictional (or real) systems that differ from the target systems in points of idealization.
Approximations are propositions (or statements) scientists are able to make regarding
the behavior of the (idealized) models. Norton’s illustrative example for the two is
that the ideal gas law is an approximation while the ideal gas model is an idealization.
Further, in his discussion of the infinite idealization cases, Norton uses this distinction
to argue that some acts of taking to the infinity limit, such as the infinite time limit
for reversible thermal processes of heat transfer, involves no idealization. They are no
more than statements of approximation. The indefinitely long time limit that allows
nonzero heat transfer between equal temperatures is an approximation of a sequence of
indefinitely many steps, at each of which an infinitesimal amount of heat is transferred.
And many well known so-called idealization cases, such as a motion on a frictionless
surface, Norton argues, are actually cases of approximation that do not necessarily
involve idealization.
Norton (2012) also talks about the difference, in the context of infinite idealization,
between taking the model system to an infinite size and taking some infinite limit on
properties as a mathematical operation. Norton regards the former as idealization
because it always results in fictional systems as models. The latter does not necessarily
involve idealization or fictional systems. Taking infinite limits on properties usually
result in approximation, that is in terms of Norton’s formulation of the two terms.
Norton also consider cases where the idealization sort of infinite limit taking often
produces ill-defined results, while the approximation sort usually does not.
We share with Norton’s insight that two different senses of reductional levels ought
to be distinguished. But as we argued above, the distinction is not cut in the same man-
ner. Our two senses would be, were we to follow Norton’s strategy, 1 SM-TD; 2 KT-TD,
where the second is the “kinetic theoretical - thermodynamic” level. And we believe
that our introduction of the aspect of abstraction (as amended from Godfrey-Smith ac-
count) and the distinction between the idealization and the abstraction approach adds
a necessary ingredient to the study of the paradox of phase transitions. Therefore, we
believe that idealized models are widespread and essential for the KT-TD reductional
study of thermo-phenomena, while in the SM-TD case, abstraction is the main method
in handling the molecular systems. This way of looking at these cases naturally yields
10
the result that while most lawlike claims in the KT-TD realm are only approximately
true, those in the realm of SM-TD are true. And the fact that the structure of re-
ductional relationship in the SM-TD relation is barely altered when one moves into
quantum statistical mechanics testifies to our idea that abstraction is often not sensi-
tive to the mechanical details of the models. And the results of abstraction, but not of
idealization, often keep their truth-values when transferred from classical to quantum
theories.
Although, as we have emphasized above, our distinction between the KT approach
and the SM approach is made conceptually in a hypothetical space of possible ap-
proaches or models, and we emphasize the speculative or theoretical nature of the KT
approach, there is good historical reason to think that the hypothesis is not pulled out
of thin air. Historically, statistical mechanics arose as the need to find a less “make-
shift,” or more rigorous, method in studying thermo-phenomena from a molecular point
of view. Part of this process is to make less unrealistic (here we could understand it as
less idealized) assumptions about the complex internal details of the studied systems.
Eventually, when SM in the hands of Gibbs emerged, we saw an abstract mathematical
theory that assumes little of the internal details except the Hamiltonian characterizing
the nature of interaction among the components and some global constraints of the
systems, such as the homogeneity and randomness of the interactions. The less the
theory says about the internal details, the less it needs from the help of idealization,
and more likely that it provides literally true claims about the systems’ behavior. The
claims may be terribly abstract, but they are true in the same sense that a claim such
as “it is red” may well be literally true of a system that is incredibly complex in other
aspects such as its shape, its structure, and its chemical composition.
SM in the guise of Gibbs is able to achieve such a level of abstraction and produce
literally true claims about thermo-systems of a much diverse variety also because it
“tucks” away a fundamental justificatory element in the assumption of ergodicity. The
intuitive assumption about the equivalence of phase average and time average that
guarantees the use of statistical mechanical laws is notoriously difficult to prove, as the
history of ergodicity testifies. And yet, the use of the assumption relieves scientists
from using individual mechanical idealization conditions to come up with molecular
models for thermo-phenomena, as in the cases of the KT-TD relationship. The three
different types of ensembles, the micro, the canonical, and the grand canonical en-
semble, are only distinguished from each other by the total energy conditions of the
systems under investigation. As to the specification of the Hamiltonian, either entirely
realistic interactional models are used or a coupling constant is put in by hand whose
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value can be determined by empirical means.
4 The “Paradox” of Phase Transitions and Critical Phe-
nomena
We shall use the so-called “paradox of phase transitions” as a special case-study to
analyze in detail the issues raised in the above discussion. The subject was broached
in the 1990s in a series of philosophical/foundational studies of phase transitions and
critical phenomena (Callender, 2001; Liu, 1999, 2001; Batterman, 2005). The issues
raised in that discussion are recently elevated to the status of “paradox” in an effort to
put the ghost to rest once for all (Bangu, 2009, 2015; Mainwood, 2005; Shech, 2013).
The conclusion, if there is any conclusion, of the recent investigation appears to be
that since we are all clear about what is actually going on with respect to the physical
details of the physical process of phase transitions and critical phenomena, the opposing
philosophical positions or puzzles over whether infinite idealization is necessary is really
a “matter of academics.” We argue that this is not so.
Since there is very little variation or dispute about the accounts of the paradox of
phase transition, we shall not engage in a detailed recount. The following sketch, which
follows a recent rendition by Bangu (2009) and Shech (2013), should suffice. The TD
account of systems comprising a large number of components, such as molecules, is a
mathematical treatment of carefully collected results of well-constructed and repeated
experiments. They are expressed in mathematical relationships among TD variables,
such as temperature, pressure, and entropy. The most illustrative and yet rigorous
display of the relationships are functional co-variation relations. Phase transitions are
common phenomena that people recognize in daily life without any help of science.
The transitions among the three states of a liquid, such as water, is perhaps the most
commonly observed and known phase transitions. Less known are transitions between
phases of magnetization in metals, such as a transition from paramagnetism (i.e. re-
moving the source of magnetization removes the effect of magnetization) to ferromag-
netism (i.e. some effect of magnetization remains after the removal of the source). The
following diagram, Figure 1, shows the phase structure of a liquid.
This is a pressure versus temperature (with constant volume) diagram, showing how
water in a container change its phases. If we concentrate on the boulder of liquid and
gas and come up with a pressure versus volume diagram of isothermal curves, namely,
each PV curve plots the change of P over V at the same temperature, then we have
the diagram as shown in Figure 2.
12
Figure 1: The phase diagram of water
Figure 2: The phase transition between liquid and vapor
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The isotherms below the temperature Tc have discontinuous points at the A
′s and
B′s, namely, the rate of changes as the tangent lines along these curves do not have
the same value as they approach these points as limits from left and from right. The
physical interpretation runs roughly as follows. As the water in the liquid phase ap-
proaches, say, point A, at the same temperature, the molecules becomes less dense and
the structure of liquid begins to loosen, so much so that until point B, the pressure
stops decreasing even when the volume increases. And this is the region where liquid
and steam coexists with varying proportions.
As Bangu (2009) tells the story, we can find the SM rendering of the same TD
variables. Once we select the correct ensemble for the system, whose selection depends
on global parameters such as whether there is exchange of energy with the environment
or of both energy and matter, the probabilistic distribution is determined. With it the
density function/operator can be found, which we use to calculate TD quantities as the
ensemble average of the appropriate mechanical magnitudes. In such a function there is
an all important function that is called the partition function Z, which mathematically
contains all the information that SM needs to recover TD in the sense that thermo-
dynamic variables are partial derivatives of the partition function or a combination
of such partial derivatives. In the most frequently used functions in such a scheme of
“recovery,” two main functions stand out. One is the Helmholtz free energy, A, and the
other the Gibbs free energy, F . They are defined exclusively by the partition function
as we see in the following equations.
A = −kBT lnZ (1)
where,
Z =
∑
i
exp(−βHi), (2)
where the summation goes through all the micro-states with energy Hi of the system
in question. And the Gibbs free energy is defined as F = A+PV . And through these,
the P ′s and V ′s and all other thermodynamic variables are defined ultimately by the
partition function of the system. For example,
P = −(∂A/∂V )T (3)
and,
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V = (∂F/∂P )T . (4)
Again, according to Bangu and Shech, the “paradox of phase transition” arises
simply because that the partition function of water or magnet is an analytic function,
above, below, or at the critical temperature Tc, to any degree of differentiation. The TD
function, such as the pressure or volume, which are the first-order partial differentiation
of Z could not possibly harbor the desired points where phase transitions are exhibited.
A “no-go” theorem is actually proven by Yang and Lee (1952) in their work on the
phase transition between the paramagnetic phase and the ferromagnetic phase (see
also, Mainwood (2005)). Yang and Lee have further proven in the same work that
when thermodynamic limit is taken on the system, the non-analyticity reappears in
the partition function (see also, Blythe and Evans (2003)). And the thermodynamic
limit is the widely used method of taking the volume and the number of particles of
the modeled system to infinity while letting the density remain finite.
In Figure 3, we see the behavior of the famous Yang-Lee zeros that represent the
effect of taking the TD limit. Yang and Lee (1952) use the Ising model for a magnet
to study the possibility of obtaining a rigorous recovery of phase transition and critical
phenomena as described by the standard TD account. The three diagrams in the
Figure show three different stages, a to b to c, of the value distribution of x on the unit
circle in a complex plane. The complex function x = e−β, where the energy levels of
the magnet is defined as E = n and n = 0, 1, 2, ...,M , is a function in the partition
function for the magnet as placed in a heat bath, namely,
Z(β) =
n=M∑
n=0
g(n)exp(−βn) (5)
The similarity between equation (2) and (5) should help convey the meaning of
equation (5). Theoretically, phase transition can only occur when x has a physically
meaningful solution (i.e. Imx = 0), or the unit circle that represents x touches the
positive Rex axis.
Yang and Lee show that without the TD limit, the mathematical situation are as
in diagram a and b, where the circles do not close on the Rex axis). Only when that
limit is taken could we see the closing of the circle as in diagram c, which means a
physical solution exists that corresponds to the existence of ferromagnetism below the
critical temperature. The latter is no less confirmed for magnets than the occurrence
of boiling for water. As Blythe and Evans (2003) explain, the Yang-Lee result obtained
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Figure 3: A diagram showing the behavior of the Yang-Lee zeros regarding TD limit
from the Ising Model of ferromagnetism is entirely generalizable to other cases of phase
transitions and critical pheomena.
The so-called “paradox of phase transition” as a philosophical problem may be
understood in two different versions.
• No finite model of a system, which is actually going through a phase transition,
exhibits such a transition according to the standard SM account of the system’s
thermo-behavior.
• A rigorous exhibition of the phase transition appears in the theory only when a
TD limit is taken (which produces an infinite physical system in the model).
The second version renders the model irreconcilable with the actual system it repre-
sents. The irreconcilability is pronounced because, as Norton (2014) points out, taking
the TD limit, which creates in our imagination an actual infinitely large system, is es-
sentially different from the more widely used taking limit technique, which only takes
this or that property of a system to the indefinitely large. The latter limit-taking pro-
cedure usually does not come with its own “no-go” theorem, whereas the TD limit is
proceeded with a distinct “no-go” theorem.
These two different versions of the paradox point to different ways of finding a
resolution. Suppose the question is, how come a finite SM model does not exhibit any
phase transition while the TD account of the transition is clear and rigorous? This is
to take the first version given above. A solution may come in the form of “try not to
take the TD account too seriously.” And this is essentially how Callender (2001) takes
and resolves the paradox (see also Bangu (2009, 2015)). Closely associated with the
Callender resolution (Liu, 1999; Bangu, 2009) is the analysis of what actually must be
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the case in the plotted curves of the TD variables that actually come from the labs. The
corners where the non-analyticity appears in the TD curves must be fuzzy and unsharp,
which might just be what a finite SM model of the actual system could reproduce. Even
if a finite SM model could not exactly reproduce the plotted lab results, it is at least
true that the “no-go” theorem can no longer be defended. That, in a minimal sense,
resolves the paradox.
Bangu (2009) (also Bangu (2015)) provides a stronger argument and a more robust
resolution than the above. By enlisting a “well-known distinction between data and
phenomena,” a general conception of scientific methodology in the works of Bogen and
Woodward (1988), Bangu is able to defend a position that takes the non-analyticity in
TD seriously (unlike what Callender advised) and yet understands the physical reality
of phase transitions. While conceding the fact that plotted data graphs from the labs
do not contain any non-analytic “corners,” (as Liu (1999) has pointed out, implying
the corresponding TD non-analytic points are artifacts in the theory), Bangu argues
that that is only in the realm of data, or data models. One cannot solely depend
on data models to conduct scientific investigations. One has to come up with the
phenomenon, or phenomenal models, before rigorous mathematical representation of
the phenomenon can begin. The TD theory in terms of continuous variables and
partial differential equations are inconceivable if one stays with the data models. And
the non-analyticities are part of the bargain for the phenomenal models.
We want to further defend Bangu’s view by making the following observation in
view of our discussion of Mainwood’s point of view at the beginning of section 2. As
Mainwood (2005) points out, there are two problems in dealing with the SM recovery
of TD phenomena (i.e. thermo-phenomena recognized and theorized in TD). One is
the “reduction problem” and the other is the “idealization problem.” The paradox of
phrase transition is not really a problem of physical ontology; not simply a problem of
finding out what actually happens in nature when a phase transition is taking place.
For if it were such a problem, well-known metaphysical positions would have to be
paraded before any sensible conclusion was drawn. For example, in that context, it
would no longer be an innocent claim to say, “of course, the system in question is made
of small particles sometimes bound and sometimes free in their movements.” Nor is
it conclusive to assume that whatever shapes the plotted lab data curves assume, the
real manners of phase transitions cannot possibly be any different. One has to get into
the debate about natural kinds, and argue whether or not phase transition is a natural
kind. The position that Callender and Liu take appears to imply that it could not be
taken as a natural kind (and therefore, should not be taken too seriously). Any yet, is
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there anything currently categorized in physics or science ultimately a natural kind, a
question Quine can be taken to have raised in serious doubt in his eponymous article
(Quine, 1969)?
Therefore, as a problem of reduction (or in our terms, it is “recovery”), we natu-
rally have to consider the difference between the SM-TD relationship and the KT-TD
relationship, as we have broached earlier in discussing Mainwood’s work. The points
made there are two. First, the SM-TD relationship is indeed a strictly reductional re-
lationship. It is intended and pursued by scientists as such, and therefore, TD must be
taken seriously. Otherwise, the SM-TD relationship would not have survived. Those of
us who engage in the debate about reduction or recovery must remember that there is
a fundamental difference between “reduction” and “elimination.” To borrow a familiar
example in philosophy of mind. The mind-body relationship may be a reductional
relation; but it does not follow from that that it is also an eliminative relation. Re-
ductiionism is not eliminativism, and the difference, among many differences, is that
the former recognizes the reality of mind while the latter denies it. If we may use the
language of natural kind, we could say that reductionists believe that mind is a natural
kind, while the eliminativists deny that. Analogously, those who regard the relation-
ship between TD and SM as one of reduction or recovery must hold TD categories,
such as phase transitions and critical phenomena, as mathematical singularities; they
must recognize the legitimacy of such categories in reality as no less real than, say, the
velocity of every molecule in the body that is undergoing phrase transition.
In this reductional relationship, the SM handling of the molecular systems is pri-
marily by way of abstraction. It is not primarily by way of idealization. The latter
belongs to the KT-TD relationship, which is much loser than the SM-TD relation; and
this is the second point. In the kinetic theory of matter, a huge variety of idealized
systems could be imagined (which Norton calls fictional systems). Since the molecular
details in the KT models, albeit highly idealized, are taken seriously in the study, devi-
ations from the TD accounts abounds. We agree with Norton to think that such studies
produce highly approximate claims about the behavior of the target systems, and yet
when properly improved upon, they give much more realistic accounts of the thermo-
phenomena than either TD or SM accounts of the same. These considerations belong
to Mainwood’s idealization problem. The problem of course is that the possibility of
improvement is very limited.
Shech (2013) provides a different way to resolve the “paradox of phase transition.”
The idea, if I understood correctly, appears to be this. Suppose we consider such
claims as there are phase transitions in finite systems in nature and yet SM says that
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no such things exist in finite systems because the partition functions of such systems
are all analytic at any temperature. Are such claims contradictory or problematic?
But these claims are ambiguous in that the central terms such as “phase transition” or
“partition function” are often semantically ambiguous. In some contexts, they are used
to refer to concrete systems and actual events in them. Partition functions may also
denote the quantity of the concrete systems. However, they are also used to referred
to mathematical objects, such as model systems and mathematical functions (say, in
mathematical physics rather than ordinary theoretical physics). By a disambiguation,
Shech believes we can dissolve the paradox. If we stick to the former semantic function
of these terms, there are no non-analyticities but phase transitions. The two do not
even have anything to do with each other from a physical point of view. So, no paradox
there. If we stick to the latter meaning of the terms, there are no phase transitions in
finite systems (models) because there are no non-analyticities in those systems. The
“no-go” theorem holds and there is no problem, nor is there any problem that phase
transitions do not exist in finite (models) systems in SM, because they exist in infinite
(model) systems. The situation is just as simple as that and the paradox is dissolved.
We disagree with some of Shech’s analysis of the philosophical situation involved
in the paradox of phase transition, but we recognize that a lot of insights are shared
between the two approaches discussed above. The idea that realistically there does
not seem to be a place for phase transitions as non-analyticities or singularities seems
to be a shared conviction; and so is the view that the “no-go” theorem is an artifact
of SM; a very important artifact, perhaps, but an artifact nonetheless. In reality,
phase transitions take place in finite physical systems, whether their mathematically
rigorous accounts contain non-analyticities or not. Such artifacts as non-analyticities
or singularities do not refer to anything physically real and should not be thought of
capable of causing philosophical paradoxes or conundrums. Notice, this view does not
necessarily apply to other areas in science, where singularities are routinely used to
represent genuine physical phenomena and do not produce “paradoxes.” For instance,
the rigorous mathematical representation of black holes uses non-analyticity and yet
few people would say: after all, black holes are in fact not singular; they are no different
ontologically from non-singular entities in a spacetime continuum; and singularity is
just an artifact in our model representation of black holes. We reserve our disagreement
with Shech about whether it is no more than a matter of semantic ambiguities until
later when we defend contextual realism.
Let us now turned to the other version of the paradox. It amounts to the ques-
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tion of how we can justify the taking of the TD limit as necessary for providing a
rigorous solution to the non-analyticity problem. As Norton (2012) notes, idealizing
a system into a physical impossibility is different from many other forms of infinite
idealization. Making a process of heat transfer a reversible process by taking time to
infinity, for instance, is a different sort of infinite idealization.9 When the time is ar-
bitrarily long enough, the temperature difference for each heat transfer could be made
arbitrarily small such that the summation remains the same. The limit is no more
than an approximation of the very large, and the desired result approaches the limit
asymptotically. There is no “no-go” theorem in this type of limit taking. The almost
reversible matches the almost infinitely long or slow of the process. The same applies
to, say, the case of motion on a frictionless plane.
Therefore, unlike the other non-problematic infinite idealization cases, taking ther-
modynamic limit that results in infinity systems does seem to raise the prospective of a
paradox. This is the problem of “Essential” or “Indispensable” Idealization that Shech
(2013) discussed at length in his article, (see also Batterman (2005)). This type of ide-
alization threatens to always cause paradoxes or conundrums or under-girt emergent
property claims. A lot of ink has been spilled on this issue, and many what we regard
as sensible or only sensible things have been said about it (Batterman, 2005, 2009; Liu,
1999, 2001; Norton, 2014, 2012). Moreover, since we are going to connect this issue
of essential/indispensable idealization with whether or not scientific realism is thereby
threatened, we shall postpone a detailed discussion until later. For now, we mention
two related points.
One may wonder with good reason why it is not possible to come up with a finite-
sized model system to account for phase transitions (and critical phenomena). If as we
said earlier, we know in an ontological sense what is going on in a phase transition,
such as happening in a tank of water or piece of magnet, why can’t we directly model
the thing and come up with a mathematical account of the phenomena? The first point
is that there are indeed some efforts to do just that, but not in as straightforwardly
a manner as one might suspect. Finite-scaling technique is an attempt to remove the
need for taking the TD limit and still recover phase transitions as non-analyticities.
We shall not engage in any explanation of what this technique is all about, but it is an
effort to rescue, so to speak, our common sense of what happens in reality (see Menon
and Callender (2011), Bangu (2009)).
The related second point is more philosophical. We have discussed at some length
the difference between recovering TD accounts with the SM approach versus recovering
9To distinguish it from the former kind, Norton calls it“approximation.”
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that with the KT approach. Given our above-given analysis of the difference between
these two types of “recovery,” we have the following conclusion. The SM accounts or
models try to avoid excessive idealizations about the material and structural details of
the target system, whereas such idealizations are mandatory and freely engaged in the
KT accounts. The kinetic theory of gases, as the simplest example of the KT approach
of condensed matter systems, exhibits all the features of attempts of idealization as well
as attempts of reducing it or relaxing it so that more realistic models result. From a
methodological point of view, if the KT approach is taken seriously in the recovery effort
of the TD account of phase transition and critical phenomena, it is quite possible that
finite-size modeling succeeds eventually. But this is only possible when the full array
of material and structural details are at the modelers’ disposal and when manageable
mathematical treatment of such details are available. Some of the examples surveyed
in Menon and Callender (2011) sufficiently indicate that the KT approach handling of
phase transition is no more than in principle possible. The actual practice of coming
up with finite-sized models for phase transitions is in fact along the line of using the
SM approach with specific structural restrictions put in.10
The situation with the SM approach and its models is very different. As we have
argued earlier, abstraction, not idealization, is the main method for building an account
that recovers the TD account of phase transitions. Unlike idealization, whose relax-
ation is conceptually unproblematic, albeit often difficult in practice, abstraction is not
something that can be “improved” upon in the same manner. In fact, it is problematic
to think of abstraction and concretization as a matter of more or less in the same way
that idealization and its relaxation are. While idealization is a distortion of a chosen
property or magnitude, abstraction is the ignoring of properties that do not effect the
truth of the abstract claims. Successful abstractions do not need “improvement” in
order to produce true statements, as seen in earlier discussion about Godfrey-Smith’s
work. Therefore, the SM account of TD phenomena is not subject to slight adjustment
for improved representation as in the case of the van der Waals gas model improving
on Boyle’s ideal gas model. When the SM account of phase transitions encounters
the difficulty of the “no-go” theorem, a solution is not to be found by adding more
real details of the target system, because one cannot add details of properties that the
original abstraction ignores. For example, an abstract claim about a red wooden ball
might be “the thing is red.” If for some reason this statement is somehow in need of
10I thank a referee for pointing out that not all cases surveyed in (Menon and Callender, 2011) are
in the KT approach camp. The conceptual point is that the KT approach encourages a study of the
complex details of a finite system in order to recover the TD account of macroscopic phenomena.
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repair, the improvement cannot be gained by adding the information of what sort of
wood the ball is made of. The statement does not even mention that the thing is made
of wood. Similarly, in a SM account of, say, ferromegnetism, the size and movement of
the components of the magnet in question is not even relevant. They do not figure in
the Hamiltonian. Adding more realistic estimates about those properties is obviously
not going to help, very much unlike the cases in a KT approach. Given the nature of a
SM account of phases transitions in general, taking the thermodynamic limit seems to
be an indispensable/essential idealization that solves the paradox and yet preserves the
integrity of the SM abstraction scheme for a condensed matter system. As far as we
know, taking the TD limit appears to be the only way of preserving SM and accounting
for phase transitions at the same time. One necessary idealization that saves a branch
of physics that do not use any other idealizations essentially.11
5 Challenges to Scientific Realism
Scientific realism has had a long history. More than one variations have been intro-
duced during that long period in which it faced challenges from many directions. An
evaluation of the implications of infinite idealization on all variations of realism is be-
yond the scope of this paper. We leave the work of discussing the more recent version of
scientific realism and their compatibility with the above analysis of infinite idealization
to another occasion.12 A complete job of sorting out whether infinite idealization poses
problems for every variety of scientific realism is perhaps best left for a monograph.
We begin our discussion with the earlier formulations of scientific realism: one from
a critic and the other from one of its best early defenders. The formulation of scientific
realism by van Fraassen in the early 1980s serves as a benchmark (Van Fraassen,
1980). According to van Fraassen, scientific realism comprises essentially two theses.
the essential terms used in a scientific theories genuinely refer, and to embrace a theory
is to have good reason to believe what it says about what those terms refer to are
true. And the conception of truth is the correspondence theory or its variation. Van
11If there is still any lingering doubt about how real the metaphysical implications are with the
case of taking the TD limit to resolve the paradox of phase transition, the case concerning quantum
measurement should supply more reason for serious concerns. It turns out that if one embraces the
decoherence approach in general as a hopeful resolution to the quantum measurement problem, one
has to inevitably face the use of thermodynamic limit on finite target systems in which quantum
measurements take place. An infinite quantum system is the only type of systems in which unitarily
inequivalent representations of algebraic quantum states appear that realize the measurement results.
We shall reserve a discussion of the quantum measurement problem to another occasion, but see
(Ruetsche, 2011; Liu and Emch, 2005)
12For more recent discussions, see Psillos (2005); Chakravartty (2011).
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Fraassen’s empiricist alternative view, namely, constructive empiricism, also adheres to
the correspondence theory of truth and the requirement for reference. It objects to the
realist demand that to accept a theory is to believe that it is true (or approximately
true). Accepting a theory, according to constructive empiricism, should only require
empirical adequacy. Richard Boyd’s version of scientific realism, as mentioned earlier,
has all the elements of van Fraassen’s characterization with the addition that theories
that are well confirmed are true or approximately true, and there is a historical progress
of science towards more approximately true theories.
The main argument for scientific realism, almost by unanimous consent, is the
inference-to-the-best-explanation argument, and there have been many different ver-
sions of this argument (Boyd, 1983). Boyd’s contribution is to precisify the notion of
success in science as the increase of reliability of scientific methodology (which includes
the theory-laden designs of experimental procedures and apparatuses). The increase
in the history of science of the reliability of scientific methodology would be a miracle
if the scientific theories that the methodology relies on were not true or approximately
true and the terms used in them did not genuinely refer.
Suppose, as we have argued above, that infinite idealization is an indispensable
scientific method in the construction of scientific theories. Does it conflict with the
notion of scientific realism articulated by van Fraassen or Richard Boyd among others?
First off, do terms such as “phase transitions” and “critical phenomena” as used in
thermodynamics, genuinely refer? Do they refer as terms used in statistical mechan-
ics? More generally, are all those terms associated in theory as non-analytical points
genuinely refer?
Then, are infinitely idealized theories, such as the theory of phase transition and
critical phenomena as a rigorous solution, fit for the sort of confirmation processes that
scientific realism sanctions? Given the discrepancy between the TD account and the
SM account of the phenomena, how can the confirmation of the two accounts cohere
with each other?
Thirdly, how are we to understand the notion of truth or approximate truth with
respect to infinitely idealized theories? With a model of an infinite system, are claims
about the behavior of such a system possibly true or approximately true? If they are
approximately true, what notion of approximate truth are we using to account for the
infinite system?
Finally, if we know that finite systems are the real systems and science aims at
representing reality as closely and adequately as possible, why is it unproblematic to
use a method that appears to be deliberately deviating from the realist spirit? To
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see the importance of this question, let us consider a similar question. Suppose we
know for sure that a human being is nothing beyond a body and its functions. Isn’t it
problematic if a mind-body dualist method turns out to be indispensable for our best
theory of human mind?
Mainwood (2005) discusses at length in section 4 of his article the question of how
one justifies using quantities under TD limit to define phase transitions in actually
finite systems, as such common phenomena as water boiling in a kettle. The challenge
Mainwood poses in that section is how one could justify such a definition as, “[p]hase
transitions occur for a finite system in state S if and only if F∞(S) has a singularity”
(Mainwood, 2005).13 Mainwood’s strategy in defending the definition is to allay two
worries about using F∞(S) to precisely account for a physical system whose free energy
“ought to” be expressed by FN (S), where N is the number of components in the system.
Part of this challenge, as we see it, is surely about the reference of terms. How does
“phase transition” defined in terms of F∞(S) refer to phase transitions in nature? Does
that term genuinely refer, as van Fraassen would ask, or is it just a piece of a theory
that aims at no more than “saving the phenomena?”
One may think that a simple answer can already be found given what we have
discussed so far. Bangu (2009), as we mentioned earlier, has already pointed out, in
lieu to arguments from Callender (2001) and Liu (1999), that we know all about what
actually is going on ontologically with phase transitions. Taking the TD limit may be
seen as a purely theoretical move to seamlessly connect SM with TD. F∞(S) simply
refers to the actual phase transition taking place in a finite physical system. This is
unproblematic because there are no other phenomena that F∞(S) refers to instead.
There is no ambiguity and there is no problem either.
However, an answer of this sort seems too simplistic. Bangu mentions the contrast
between data and phenomena, where the former is closer to the collection of observa-
tions and the latter the theoretical understanding. The connection between the two is
not usually characterizable by a simple notion of reference. The freedom of theoretical
considerations in coming up with models for phenomena may create alternative repre-
sentations for the same set or cluster of experimental findings from the labs. Consider
the following hypothetical situation. Here we assume what we have defended earlier of
the conceptually possible KT approach, where a detailed idealized model of the exact
molecular positions and movements over time are given. And we assume that at least
one strategy of coming up with a finite-system account for phase transitions is feasible,
as discussed in Menon and Callender (2011). Suppose besides our F∞(S) description
13Here, F∞(S) is the Gibbs free energy of the system in state S.
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of phase transitions (e.g. boiling water or ferromagnetism) we also had a KT model
for them that does not involve taking the TD limit. Call the latter a KN (S) account.
We may now ask: which term, F∞(S) or KN (S), refers to phase transitions? A further
question may also be asked. If we had the KN (S) account, which let us assume is more
realistic, would we be forced to give up the F∞(S) account? The answer is neither clear
nor simple. For someone who embraces, say, van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism,
it might be more reasonable to argue that each term refers to something real but is
radically different from the other. So the literal stories using one or the other term
are incompatible; and yet they both save the phenomena 14 of phase transitions as
observed in the labs and in daily life.
Inconclusive as the above, we can at least say this: to say simply that we know
all about what phase transitions are ontologically in a finite physical system is a bit
too hasty. Therefore, to try to figure out what F∞(S) or KN (S) says or refers to by
assuming that they are no more than theoretical artifacts is premature philosophically.
In Section 4, we argue for a position that avoids having to make such claims about
what reality is like ontologically in order to defend scientific realism.
Laymon (1985) has developed a theory of confirmation that is specifically designed
to deal with idealized theories. In slogan form, it says that an idealized theory is con-
firmed if and only if it monotonically approbates approximation when the idealization
conditions are gradually relaxed and/or removed. And idealized theories are no prob-
lem for realism if they monotonically approbate approximation because it would be a
miracle if they did such a thing and yet laws and such that the idealized theories pos-
sess were not true and terms did not genuinely refer. Space prevents us from discussing
Laymon’s theory in detail, but see Liu (2004, 2007). We only want to point out that
when applied to the method of infinite idealization, there are definite complications.
We have seen when discussing Norton’s work on infinite idealization that there are two
radically different types of infinite idealization. The more common ones are those that
do not require an imagining of real infinite systems in order to theoretically represent
phenomena in finite systems. These are cases such as frictionless planes and adia-
batic heat transfers. In these cases of infinite idealization, incrementally smaller and
smaller effects are taken ad infinitum. The value at the limit differs from any next clos-
est values only infinitesimally such that Laymon’s idea of monotonically approbating
approximation is precisely applicable in these cases.
In addition, Laymon (1989) argued that in most cases of idealization, the laws as the
14In our context, here it should be the “data model.”
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result of the idealization are true, not approximately true, while the models in which the
laws are exhibited do not actually exist. For example, the law of inertia in Newtonian
mechanics can only be displayed in the model of frictionless systems. The law is true
but the model does not exist. Such are what Norton calls fictional or fictitious models,
but they approximate the real system and the degrees of approximation can in many
cases be estimated numerically. Again, Laymon argues that precisely because the laws
are true, the relaxation of the ideal conditions for the models results in the models
asymptotically approach the experimentally obtained data. Otherwise, the relaxation
would not work.
This felicitous situation, we argue, is not true for the other type of infinite ideal-
ization, the type that contains the results of taking the TD limit. These are the cases
where a “no-go” theorem is accompanied when the system is finite or indefinitely large.
This is the type that Norton regards as involving genuine (infinite) idealization; (the
other type involves approximation only). Further, no laws of nature are exhibited in
such models. On the contrary, the phenomena, such as boiling and ferromagnetism,
are fully observable and real. The TD limit is taken so that the theory of SM says
the right things about what we can readily observe. Without infinite systems (which
by the way are real infinities, much unlike the infinitesimals in the previous type of
cases), there are no phase transitions. Any slight relaxation of this idealization results
in nothing comprehensible or useful in SM with respect to making judgments about
the phenomena. Whether or not Laymon’s theory of confirmation can cover this case
and other similar cases and still honor scientific realism remains an unmet challenge.
Theories of approximate truth have been closely associated with notions of approxi-
mation. When it can be proven that solutions for certain equations exist but no method
of solving them exactly are in sight, methods of approximation are often introduced in
the form of, say, Taylor expanding a supposed solution and obtain an actual solution
by truncating the expansion, abandoning the higher order terms which are very small.
Hilpinen (1976) has developed a general theory of approximate truth that says a propo-
sition p is approximately true within the threshold of ε if and only if there is a possible
world that is no farther away from the actual world in the measure of comparison, ε, in
which p is true. Again, we can see without spelling out the details of the reason that
this notion of approximate truth fits the first type of infinite idealization but not the
second type, the type that is causing the trouble.
And given all these difficulties with the second type of infinite idealization, it seems
entirely reasonable to ask whether infinite idealization such as taking the thermody-
namic limit in order to recover a rigorous account of phase transitions and critical
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phenomena is at all compatible with scientific realism.
Before we develop the view of contextual realism, which we think helps to meet the
challenge, let us emphasize the fact that we are forced philosophically into this option
by the specialness of the type of infinite idealization that is exemplified by taking the
TD limit. Although most idealizations are infinite idealizations, such as making the
discrete into continuous quantities, the special challenge does not arise from them.
6 Contextual Realism
6.1 Cases
We begin in this section to sketch a philosophical position, which we shall call Contex-
tual Realism or scientific contextualism.15 We argue for such a position in a limited
fashion by only using the case of the infinite idealization of the more problematic type
as a testing ground. We shall see that enlisting contextual realism helps us to main-
tain that we know what is going on with phase transitions in finite physical systems
and that a realist view is compatible with a substantive use of taking the TD limit.
For a full development of the position we leave for another occasion, but in the next
subsection, we give a sketch of it.
First, we clarify and dispose of some potentially misleading ideas about contextu-
alism in general and contextual realism in particular. The most familiar contextualism
would be epistemic contextualism (Lewis, 1996; DeRose, 2009). Contextualism about
epistemic claims is not about the context-dependent nature of which beliefs may be
counted as true or justified. That would be conflating contextualism with relativism.
Contextualism is about the context-dependency of knowledge attribution, namely, when
or under what conditions an attribution of knowledge to an agent is true is a context-
dependent matter. The same claim that “S knows that p” may turn out to be true
in one context but may not in another. It all depends on the standard of knowledge
attribution or of sufficient justification; and one standard in one context or with one
community may not be so in another. The context in which the Cartesian doubt of any
piece of knowledge is taken seriously must be quite different from the context in which
the most secure set of common-sense beliefs are regarded as knowledge. The opposing
15As far as I know, there isn’t any known territory in philosophy that bears the name of Contextual
Realism. The best known example of its mentioning is in Fine (1991) when referring to a position
espoused by Richard Miller (Miller, 1987). Fine’s own name for the position is called “Piecemeal
Realism.” It is a different position from the one we defend here; and we intend to reserve the discussion
of its relationship with our position for another occasion.
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view to contextualism is invariantism, where knowledge claims are invariant across all
contexts.
Similarly, contextual realism is not about the context dependency of the truth-
makers of scientific claims. It is rather about when or under what conditions a realist
claim about a scientific practice or theory is true. And the notion of realism here may
be any of the traditional versions of scientific realism, such as van Fraassen’s or Boyd’s
version as we discussed before. The strategy here is diametrically opposite to, say,
Putnam’s maneuver towards internal realism (Putnam, 1981). Putnam’s strategy is to
move away from the correspondence theory of truth and the accumulative approach
towards more and more approximately true theories in science. Our strategy is to
retain all that and modify the expectations of claims for realism.
To begin our sketch of contextual realism, let us consider some illustrative examples.
As Dummett (1982) reminds us, the question concerning realism is really a collection of
questions concerning the existence of this or that disputed class of objects and the truth
of the existence claims about such objects. The collection may well be heterogeneous:
whether the past is real or exist is not the same question about realism as whether
numbers are real or exist. And both are very different from whether or not electrons
or quarks are real. And in the current case, the disputed class of objects are rather
peculiar to say the least. What we are asking is whether such phenomena as phase
transitions as defined in SM for infinite systems exist in a sense that is compatible to
realism. And if we follow Mainwood (2005), this is a question of how it may be true
that “[p]hase transitions occur for a finite system in state S if and only if F∞(S) has
a singularity.”
We now consider three examples. The first is Boyle’s ideal gas model and Boyle’s law
for ideal gas. Then it is the model of Carnot engine or cycle in which adiabatic processes
take place. The third is our SM model for phase transitions and critical phenomena in
which TD limit must be taken in order for the phenomena to be possible. As a case for
contrast, we also consider a case of elementary particles, for example, the question of
the existence of quarks. We shall take it as obvious that the ideal gas (as modeled by
Boyle) does not exist or is not real, nor is the Boyle law for that gas a law of nature;
nor is it even approximately true of nature. And it is entirely compatible with realism
to deny the existence of ideal gas. We can think of the model as a pure fiction, as
Norton (2014, 2012) has thought so.
Here we see one of the features of contextual realism. The contextual elements that
make us reject the ideal gas as real are of the following sort. The assumption about
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the components of the target system, e.g. tanks of diluted gas, is perhaps vague but
entirely realistic. The ideal gas model in which highly idealized assumptions (namely,
assumptions of distortion), such as the zero size of, and no interaction among, the
moving molecules, are made is taken as a highly sketchy representation of the target
system, i.e. the diluted gas. The model itself and the ideal gas law can only be taken
as a rough “map” of the thermo-behavior of the system. In another place, we call such
laws as the Boyle’s law a “law-map,” not a law. It and the like are not intended by
the scientists themselves to represent laws of nature (not even in approximate degrees
of accuracy). They are rather given as guides to the discovery of laws. Hence, a
realistic but vague idea about the components and their behavior of the gas and a
highly idealized model intended to represent the gas in a rough-and-ready way, these
are the contextual beliefs that ground the claim that Boyle’s model is fictitious or
fictional.
Notice, the above situation is very different from the contextual beliefs scientists
have or would have regarding a model of quarks and the lawlike claims concerning their
behavior. There is no contextual belief that assume that quarks and their behavior are
radically different (because of idealization) from what our theory of quarks say about
them. There is also no explicit contextual belief that our current theory is no more
than a rough-and-ready sketch of quarks. There may be, instead, beliefs about the
abstractness of our theory; but as we have argued earlier, abstraction is a very different
method than idealization, and claims under abstraction are often literally true rather
than approximately true. So, a realist claim about the existence of quarks can be in
serious dispute, rather unlike in the case of ideal gas, where the model and laws are
clearly not real.
Also note, there is no impossibility for the existence of ideal gas. In a possible world
that obeys the same laws of nature as the actual one, systems of ideal gas could well
exist and function without any apparent problem. It is entirely possible as a matter of
fact that no molecules in any tanks of gas ever interact with each other. As to the zero-
size assumption, it can be replaced by the idea of indefinitely small sizes. Therefore, as
in literary fiction, if we suspend our disbelief and forget the actual world, the fictional
world might feel as real as the actual one.
Another important point to notice is that this analysis of a realist reading of the
situation agrees with Laymon’s account of how idealized models and laws that are
exhibited in them square with realism. Recall that a necessary condition for lawlike
claims to be laws of nature in an idealized model is for them to monotonically approbate
approximation. Boyle’s law of ideal gas cannot do that because to relax the idealization
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in this case, namely, going into a model of gas such as the van der Waals model, the
gas law has to be changed (into the van der Waals law of gas). This is another reason
for regarding the Boyle’s ideal gas model and law as purely fictional.
The second example is a case of pure thermodynamics, which we have discussed
earlier in connection with the works of Norton (2014, 2012). Norton has argued that
there is no idealization but only approximation in this case of taking the infinite time
limit that ensures reversibility. What he means, as we have interpreted him earlier, is
that no imaginary model of the components of the target system is built in this case, and
what is done is to take an infinite time limit to approximate the actual results of near
reversibility. As we have argued then, this case certainly involves a TD model and the
model is the reversible Carnot cycle, where the efficiency is at maximum and heat can
be transferred without a temperature differential. However, the model is not made by
idealizing the micro-components of the target system; rather the entire compositional
details of the system are abstracted away. The main contextual assumption or belief in
this case is therefore the absence of micro-components of the system. As in the cases for
abstraction, many claims from the abstract TD model of the Carnot cycle are literally
true in the context (namely, by disregarding those very unlikely large fluctuations).
Under contextual realism, thermodynamic terms and claims in general are genuinely
referring terms and literally true or false, even though there is another context within
which the reference relations are shaky and claims are only approximately true or
even flatly false. As we make explicit in the next section, the anchoring or grounding
assumption that defines the context of this case is that condensed matter is continuous.
But what about reversible processes? Do they exist in nature or do such terms
genuinely refer? Given that taking time to the limit of infinity is impossible, a special
problem for realism arises. The first thing to notice is that the necessity for taking
the time limit is occasioned by the context-defining abstraction that no compositional
details are to be considered or condensed matter is continuous. For otherwise, if we
go beyond TD and look at the molecular level of the system, reversibility is more fun-
damental than irreversibility! Between two subsystems at equilibrium in this context,
heat transfers in the form of molecules moving in-between take place all the time.
Summing over the process in a long but finite time, it is entirely possible a certain
quantity of heat is transferred from one side to the other, or vice versa, without any
appreciable temperature differentials. But our anchoring belief in the context of TD
systems forbids such considerations. As in the case of phase transitions and critical
phenomena under the TD limit, here we are also faced with the following choice. We
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may adhere to the abstraction that thermodynamic modeling requires and account
for reversibility in terms of the infinite time limit. Let us call this choice the t∞ op-
tion. Or we could go with what we have just described as the molecular approach (or
micro-kinetic approach), which we may call the KN option. If in the context of the t∞
option, there is no possible alternative account for reversible heat transfer, especially
there is no account that does not require taking the infinite time limit, then we say,
as a contextual realist would, that reversible heat transfer as depicted by the model of
reversible Carnot cycle is a thing; it exists. The fact that there is also a KN option in
a different context does not render the above realist claim false or problematic.
Again, this case is somewhat different from the quark case. There is no clear-cut
stipulation of abstraction that insulate high-energy physicists from looking further into
the details of quarks. And although quark models are surely abstract, but in what
way it is abstract could never be made clear. That is because we do not have a set of
beliefs about quarks analogous to the beliefs we have about the molecules in a thermo-
system such that we know what we have abstracted away from quarks. Therefore,
questions about quarks or electrons or any other elementary particles/waves may be
regarded as analogous to knowledge attribution claims that require the highest standard
of justification (where Cartesian skepticism is generated). There is no “insulation” by
way of abstraction for elementary particle physicists. If there is a science that is no
holds barred, that is elementary particle physics or unified field theory because they
are by scientists’ stipulation about the ultimate furniture of reality. This is surely
right because if scientific realism holds for science at all, it must hold for the theory of
the ultimate furniture of reality. In other words, if contextual realism holds at all, it
must hold for realism simpliciter, namely, there must be a default or ultimate context
that needs no contextual assumptions. In other words, contextual realism is first and
foremost a realist position, which simply says that the ultimate furniture of reality
exists independently of any possibility of being known by any cognitive agents.
Again, Laymon (1985)’s version of realism and the asymptotic idea of idealization
as approximation approbation apply to case of reversibility without much problem.
Relaxing the time limit and making the model more realistic would not eliminate
the effect of reversibility. It is similar to the case of frictionless plane. By adding
back infinitesimally the effect of friction, the behavior of the system will be gradually
recovered to what can be experimentally reproduced. Laymon’s account covers all
idealization cases of this type and realism is safe in the context of condensed matter
systems, where abstracting microscopic details away from consideration anchors or
grounds the discipline.
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The SM account of phase transitions by taking the TD limit can be handled in a
similar manner. What is different from the pure TD account of reversible processes
is that we are now considering molecular models of thermo-systems. We shall not
repeat the actual analysis of the case here. For that we refer our reader back to our
detailed discussion in section 4, where two different versions of the “paradox of phase
transition” are thoroughly investigated. Here we sketch an argument for why that
analysis fits well with contextual realism so that phenomena such as phrase transitions
and critical phenomena in infinite systems do exit.
If our analysis in section 4 is correct, whether one takes the first or the second ver-
sion of the paradox of phase transition, the central issue is whether one is considering
the SM-TD relationship or the KT-TD relationship. Here we further argue that the
realist concerns about referring terms and approximate truth are different in these two
relationships; or the two relationships exhibit two different contexts. If one takes the
SM-TD relationship, the grounding assumption for the context comprises the abstrac-
tions that are taken to come up with SM models that involve as little distortions (i.e.
idealizations) as possible. The KT-TD relationship is the opposite. It assumes a great
deal about the compositional details and introduces many distortions in order to tidy
up the details so that aggregate properties that parallel TD properties can be had. It
is quite possible that the finite-system KT accounts with highly idealized components
could “almost” recover the TD properties in question. As we have emphasized before,
this is a possibility claim that should be treated as for the purpose of clarifying concepts
rather than establishing facts.
This is a case that doesn’t fit Laymon’s realist position for idealized theories. The
“no-go” theorem for finite systems in such a case makes it more reasonable to consider
infinite systems with finite density more as fictional systems than systems that exist.
However, when we use a contextual realist viewpoint to look at this case, the situation
becomes quite different. The great and single idealization of the TD limit is introduced
in the SM-TD relationship precisely because, unlike in the case of the KT-TD rela-
tionship, there is little or no “essential idealizations” involved in most of the recovery
of the true TD statements by SM accounts. The lack of competing alternative SM
accounts for phase transitions also contributes to the evaluation that the realist claim
that “phase transitions as the non-analyticities in infinite systems exist” is true.
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6.2 General Conception
What then is Contextual Realism, given the above case-studies of its applications?
Here we give an account of what can only be regarded as an initial approach. The
inspiration and parallel is, of course, contextualism in epistemology.16
One of the challenges for the version of scientific realism that takes reference and
truth to be radically independent of any epistemic or philosophical conceptions we have
of reality is, of course, how implausible it seems. It implies that however reasonable our
current semi-metaphysical beliefs about the subatomic particles or waves or wavicles
are, claims about them may well be utterly false and may never be discovered as such
by any cognitive agents.
In contrast, Putnam’s internal realism and Dummett’s anti-realism deny such a
radical independence of truth (Dummett, 1982; Putnam, 1981). Truth is intrinsically
connected to epistemic justification; and according to internal realism, a claim is true
if and only if it is fully justified in an idealized limit of justification. The limit can
never be reached and yet truth/falsity is guaranteed there, just as frictionless systems
can never be had in the actual world and yet the law of inertia obtains in such systems
alone.17
Contextual realism also eschews the radical independence implication of realism
in its original guises. But we think that the problem lies not in the correspondence
theory of truth for the first-order scientific claims. We believe that without that, the
connection between our representation and what is represented, the world, which is
surely independent of our epistemic status, can never be properly characterized. We
see the problem, instead, as a problem of neglecting the many grounding or anchoring
metaphysical or semi-metaphysical assumptions or beliefs that laypeople or scientists
legitimately make routinely. Realism without contextual considerations is bare real-
ism that only applies to the most fundamental furniture of reality, whatever those are.
But such a realism is too dogmatic for any reasonable philosophical allegiance. The
reasonable assumptions or beliefs that soften realism are manifested as the anchor-
ing/grounding abstractions/idealizatins that different contexts institute for insulating
a body of knowledge so that realist claims are only evaluated within the limits of such
16I thank a referee of the journal for pointing out to us a recent work by Michael Shaffer, Coun-
terfactuals and Scientific Realism (Palgrave 2012), which appears to have relevance to the position of
contextual realism we defend here. It is a work that proposes and defends a contextual theory of ideal-
ization, which is in turn used to simplify the treatment of counterfactuals so as to relieve the pressure
counterfactuals have on scientific realism. Upon viewing the work, we have come to the conclusion that
it is not feasible to fully discuss in this paper the many ideas and arguments in Shaffer’s work; nor does
it at all render the position of contextual realism we defend in our paper redundant or superfluous.
17The analogy is actually evoked by Putnam (1981), p. 55.
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constraints. Or we may look at the problem this way. One of the tasks for judging
the existence claims about a disputed class of objects or the reference of a disputed
set of terms is to separate objects into real versus fictional or to separate terms into
referring or non-referring. Contextual realism seeks to make such sorting jobs more
reasonable and convergent with the scientifically informed common-sense views rather
than otherwise. For example, if realism makes the singularities in the TD account as
phrase transitions below the critical temperature a fictional rather than a real thing in
science, the realism is no good. Contextual realism makes such things real with good
reasons.18
To some extent, contextual realism and its conception of anchoring assumptions
have an affinity with a by now well defended idea that “less is different” or “less is
better” or “less can be more explanatory,” (see, Butterfield (2011), Batterman and
Rice (2014), Morrison (2012)). Roughly, the idea is that many jobs of scientific de-
scription/explanation are better accomplished by abstracting away from the physical
systems that are full of complexities and difficult to handle either theoretically or ex-
perimentally. This is also a standard argument now defending emergence or emergent
properties or systems. For us, this is certainly correct because when some special ab-
stractions or idealizations are in place, the simplified or beautified systems may contain
“emergent” real objects that are otherwise non-existing. Without anchoring assump-
tions that ensure a context, cats and dogs will be no different from heaps of molecules,
and phase transitions will appear no sharper than any changes of the configurations of
heaps of molecules.
Epistemic contextualism also leaves the theory of truth alone. It does not neces-
sarily embrace the correspondence theory, unlike the case of contextual realism, but
it is entirely compatible with any theory of truth that makes the truth of our beliefs
independent of justification. What is contextually dependent is the standards by which
knowledge attribution is made. The different standards could be those of evidential
justification, which implies an internalist position; or they could be about the qualities
of reliable true-belief production systems, which then would be an externalist position.
Either way, the everyday standard of knowledge claim may be radically different from
the scientific standard for the same subject. The highest of all standard may well be
18There is a prima facie resemblance, in analogy, between the anchoring/grounding assumptions for
contextual realism and what David Lewis calls ‘sotto-voce proviso’ for knowledge claims, see (Lewis,
1996). I thank a referee for suggesting this analogy. The similarity in analogy between the two items
is quite striking. Both are needed in their separate domains to dispel possibilities that render the
respective beliefs, the truth of a claim or the reality of an entity, suspect. Both are often given, say in
textbooks, as passing remarks, as in the case of infinite population, complete randomness, etc.
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the Cartesian standard, which produces a version of skepticism that seems impossible
to surmount for empirical beliefs.
Contextual realism has a similar structure, but the contexts are for claims about
realness or existence, not about knowledge attribution; and the anchoring assumptions
that define contexts are about features or facts of reality. As our examples in the pre-
vious section demonstrated, realist claims about entities or phenomena in the context
of the SM approach could be quite different from such claims in the context of the KT
approach. The context of TD is yet another different context. Crossing contexts may
render what is a true claim of existence or realness no longer true. Phase transitions
as singularities in the contexts of TD and SM is no longer true in the context of KT,
although all three have ways to account for the observable phenomena of phase tran-
sitions. And parallel to the Cartesian standard for knowledge attribution, there may
well be a zeroth level “context,” the context for elementary particles or unified fields.
As we have mentioned earlier, the realist claims about the ultimate fundamental
elements of nature, if there are such things, need no assumptions about any context for
realism. But for many other types of things and the claim that they exist or are real,
contexts have to be given, for otherwise they may simply be non-existing or false. The
most common such contexts are the ones that ensure that the claims about the realness
or existence of ordinary objects may be true. Does a table we see and feel exist when
what “actually” exists is a heap of molecules? Many argue against ordinary-object
realism precisely because what exists are heaps of molecules (see, Thomasson (2007)).
But with contextual realism, ordinary objects can be real or exist if we have good reason
to believe that there are anchoring conditions that properly insulate such objects. In
fact, we may argue that the anchoring conditions for ordinary-object realism may have
been given to us by our sense organs. Other anchoring or grounding conditions or
assumptions are more theoretical or even metaphysical. Condensed matter may be
regarded as continuous matter rather than being composed of multiple discrete units.
Here disregarding the discontinuous nature of bulk matter is an anchoring assumption.
The result is the legitimacy of making realist claims about TD qualities or entities.
Another way of anchoring a context for realism for bulk (or condensed) matter is to
keep the discrete compositionality but take the TD limit. It turns out the some of the
same realist claims as in the context of continuous bulk matter remain true in this new
context.
It is obvious that anchoring or grounding assumptions are essential to contextual
realism. Contextual realists believe that realist claims about any types of disputed ob-
jects can only be evaluated as true or false within a context, and a context is determined
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or defined by its anchoring assumptions. But what are the anchoring or grounding as-
sumptions? How are they defined and determined? These and other related questions
need to be addressed before one can evaluate the viability of contextual realism. The
function of anchoring assumptions is to insulate parts or levels of reality so as to secure
reasons for believing of certain objects as real or existing that would otherwise not be
believable. The parts or levels are not determined by conventions or language frames
or convenience of practice or some such things. They are a feature of reality itself that
makes the anchoring assumptions possible. In other words, the reality we live in might
not be one that allows for anchoring assumptions to be reasonably made. A possible
world in which nothing except a few identical particles move about and never interact
in any way would not be a world in which anchoring conditions we have been talking
about could be met. In that world, realism is realism simpliciter. In such a world,
it does not make sense to claim that over and beyond the existence of those parti-
cles, there also exist objects of other types. But in our world/reality, contexts beyond
the ultimate level do exist and there are objects that exist only in their own context.
Change to another context, the objects “disappear.” In a general sense, at the ultimate
level of fundamental particles and/or fields, cats and dogs don’t exist or are not real
because in the context of nothing but individual particles, a cat may be more similar
to a dog than to another cat. But it is entirely possible, or even very likely, that there
is a level or context within which cats are more like each other than like dogs. Such a
context may well be the context within which biology assumes an autonomous statues,
and biological kinds, i.e., species are real or exist.
Therefore, contextual realism holds only if there are good reasons to believe in the
assumptions that anchor parts or levels of reality. The assumptions may not be about
anything in the realities that they anchor, but they are factual, although some may be
mathematical facts. In general, they are assumptions of abstraction or idealization; but
not any abstractions or idealizations could be anchoring ones. The anchoring abstrac-
tions or idealizations are those that locate the separation of parts or levels of reality.
Different parts or levels are different realities or different contexts of reality, whichever
way one prefers to call it, and the separation conditions are represented by the anchor-
ing assumptions. Once such assumptions are justifiably made, the part or level with
the assumptions is secured and claims about the existence of objects of the disputed
types can be evaluated within that part or level. As to how anchoring assumptions are
determined for a part or context, the question can only be answered by the practicing
scientists. This is exactly how taking the TD limit as an anchoring assumption for
recovering TD entities, such as phase transitions and critical phenomena, is discovered,
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i.e., by mathematical physicists.
We eschew in general any formal one-paragraph definition of any “-ism,” but we
can summarize the above articulation and argument for contextual realism as follows.
Contextual realism is a version of scientific realism. The traditional versions of scientific
realism may be regarded as about a particular reality of contextual realities. Perhaps
that is a realism about the context of the ultimate furniture of reality. Contextual
realism is also a version of local realism, which advocates claims about reality for this
or that part of scientific discourse. Contextual realism provides a clear conception
of a context of reality that is anchored by semi-metaphysical conditions (stated as
assumptions) such that existence claims can be evaluated and objects that are referred
to in the scientific account of that part of reality so anchored may be separated into
“being real” and “being fictional.” Thus, contextual realism provides a reasonable way
of looking at models constructed for a part of reality that a scientific theory deals
with and telling which represent real systems and which fictional ones. Anchoring
assumptions are a special sort of abstraction or idealization claims that define a part or
level of reality. Existence claims are always context dependent in that they are true, if
they can be true, under the anchoring assumptions that define the context. Claims true
in one context may be no longer true in another. How contexts are separated objectively
is determined by nature; they are not determined by convention, or language frames, or
the practice of science. Assumptions of abstraction and/or idealizations make explicit
the conditions under which different realities (or parts or levels of Reality) are separated.
Again, contextual realism is different from epistemic contextualism, although they
have a great deal in common in spirit.19 Contextual realism is a position on realism,
while epistemic contextualism is a position on knowledge attribution. The challenge
that epistemic contextualism aims at meeting is the challenge of skepticism, while con-
textual realism aims at overcoming the challenge anti-realism poses, namely, how could
one believe in the realness of such things as phase transitions and critical phenomena
as singularities in infinite systems? Isn’t it more reasonable to think of such things as
pure theoretical instruments? Contextual realism as we have defined and defended it
provides good reasons to believe otherwise. Epistemic contextualism is about knowl-
edge attribution claims, while contextual realism is about reality/existence attribution
claims. The contexts in epistemic contextualism are defined by different standards
for knowledge claims, while the contexts in contextual realism are defined by special
abstraction/idealizations assumptions.
19I thank a referee of the journal for urging me to clarify the difference between epistemic contextu-
alism and contextual realism.
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It might be argued that the contextual realism we have defended appears to have
a great deal in common with the version of “ontological relativism” famously given by
Rudolf Carnap (Carnap, 1950).20 It raises the possibility that contextual realism is
no more than Carnap’s ontological relativism, or at least, an explanation is owed of
why on top of that famous view on ontology, we need to have our version of contextual
realism. Despite some surface similarities between Carnap’s view on ontology and our
view on realism, the two views/positions are completely different. First, let us see why
it may appear that there is a strong similarity between the two views. Carnap argues
that whether some entities, such as electrons and genes and even phase transitions,
exist or are real depends on in which language framework such questions are asked. If
in a language framework, claims about electrons are properly connected to claims that
can be empirically tested, then electrons exist. Otherwise, electrons do not exist (if the
language does not contain such explicitly empirical means of answering such questions).
Therefore, ontology is relative to language frames, and the choice of language frames
is a matter of pragmatics, namely, is it useful to scientists or not? This is no doubt
too rough a characterization of Carnap’s position, but we hope it suffices to clarify the
issue at hand. If we identify Carnap’s language frames with our contexts, isn’t it rather
obvious, as the objection goes, that our context dependent claims of what is real or
exist and what is or does not, are essentially the same as the language frame dependent
claims in Carnap?
The first thing we want to point out is that there is no good reason to think that
Carnap’s ontological relativism is, or could be construed as, a form of realism of any
stripe. Carnap’s ontological relativism is in fact one of the flagships for an empiricist
or anti-realist position. The position we have defended is a realist position, it has no
affinity with Carnap’s position. But perhaps, it might be argued that our contextual
realism is really a sham; it is really a disguised anti-realist position. We do not think
there is any reason to support such a claim. In a similar manner, there is no good
reason to believe that epistemic contextualism, say of the DeRose version, is in fact
a version of skepticism, namely, since the entitlement of knowledge claims varies from
context to context, there is no real knowledge at all. So, while formally, Carnap’s
ontological relativism is a form of anti-realism, just as relativism in epistemology is a
form of skepticism, our contextual realism is a position of realism, just as epistemic
contextualism is a position that aims at refuting skepticism.
In principle, we have disposed of the suggestion that our position of contextual
realism is just another form of Carnap’s ontological relativism. But we could go on
20I thank a referee of the journal for raising this objection in connection with Carnap’s work.
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and offer an explanation as to why the two positions appear to be similar and yet are
fundamentally different. This goes back to how Carnap’s ontological relativism should
be properly understood. For Carnap, there is a clear distinction between an internal
question and an external question about the existence of something. The internal
questions concern the empirically determinable facts in a given language framework.
The external questions are empty questions because the possible answers for them
go beyond experience into the traditional realm of metaphysics. Such answers are
without sense or meaning. A necessary (but not sufficient) condition for answering
the internal questions is the selection of a language frame, which itself is a practical
matter that is neither true or false but useful or not useful. This is the relativity
thesis on ontology. It does not deal with the metaphysical question of whether realism
holds or not. Contextual realism is not a relativist position on realist claims. It
is first and foremost a realist position. The fundamental furniture of the universe,
whatever they turn out to be or whether mankind can last long enough to finally
discover what they are, exist independently of human cognition or language frames
or any such cognitive fixtures. Secondly, it is a contextual realism in that not only
the fundamental furniture but also such things as phase transitions as singularities in
physically impossible infinite systems also exist entirely independent of any cognition, if
they exist at all. And they exist in a context that is anchored by essential abstractions
or idealizations. Anchoring idealizations/abstractions are not strategies of language
use or stipulations about meaning (i.e. about the semantics of terms), nor are they a
matter of practical utilities. They are claims about facts of the world, and the facts are
those that define a part or level of reality or that distinguish one reality from another.
Given that our arguments for contextual realism are cogent, realms of real entities are
multiple and differ, sometime greatly, from one another.
Now, although we believe that the F∞ account of phase transitions in SM admits
a realist interpretation under contextualism and we have argued for it, we are not
wedded to it. If eventually it becomes clear that such notions can only refer to fictional
systems (because, among other reasons, the systems under the TD limit are literally
of infinite size), it does not necessarily refute contextual realism. However, whichever
way it comes down for the statues of such infinite model systems, whether they end up
real or fictional, the reason for either should still be a contextual one.
The idea of contextual realism may also be grafted onto other categories. For
example, we may have a contextual theory of natural kinds. We have no space in this
paper to fully explain and defend such a theory, but the rough idea is that what counts
as a natural kind or whether some kind can be legitimately counted as a natural kind is
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context dependent. When fully developed, such a view may be used to counter Quine’s
eliminativist view on natural kind terms (Quine, 1969).
7 Conclusion
The realist claim that the infinite system exists (is real) in which a phase transition as
a non-analytic point takes place is true in the context of Statistical Mechanics. The
context in this case comprises fundamental metaphysical beliefs about bulk-systems
of molecules and the beliefs in the form of abstraction away from the details of the
molecules. The TD limit is a necessary idealization that makes a rigorous account
of phase transitions possible in the context of SM theories. Changing to a different
context, a context of kinetic theory of the same physical system, for example, the
realist claim can no longer be regarded as true. The paradox of phase transitions
as understood in the literature is therefore, if we are right in this paper, an apparent
paradox; it dissolves in the light of contextual realism. Our solution bares resemblances
to almost all the attempts at resolving the paradox we discussed in the paper. But
we differ from Shech (2013)’s in that we do not regard it as a problem of semantic
or meaning of the terms, such as “phase transitions.” We differ from Bangu (2009,
2015)’s in that ours is perhaps a more general or more philosophical solution. The
data model versus phenomena distinction may be regarded as two different contexts in
contextual realism. Mainwood (2005)’s solution is a multiproned approach that we shall
not simply connect to contextual realism. And Norton (2014, 2012)’s approach also fits
into the contextual realist approach when we realize that the burden of the second type
of infinite idealization in Norton’s sense differs from his first type precisely because the
grounding metaphysical beliefs that define the context for the second type are radically
different from those for the first. Abstractions are different from idealization in many
aspects. The inattention to their differences in some of the discussions of infinite
idealization is among the source of confusion.
The conception of contextual realism needs more clarification; more examples should
be studied to explore the richness of this conception. Another important category of
cases for infinite idealization consists of the different models for solving the quantum
measurement problem (see footnote 7). And one needs to conduct a detailed discussion
of Miller (1987)’s initial idea of contextual realism and Fine (1991)’s further develop-
ment of it in his articulation and criticism of piecemeal realism.
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